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Introduction
The mean field game theory studies the behavior of the large number of small players by ex-
amination the limit case when the number of players tends to infinity. The main assumptions of
the mean field game approach are that: (i) the players are identical; (ii) the interaction between
the players is performed by certain averaging characteristics. The study of mean field game theory
starts with seminal papers by Lasry and Lions [23, 24] and Huang, Caines and Malhame´ [17, 18].
There are several approaches in the mean field game theory. First one reduces the original game
with infinitely many players to the initially-boundary value problem for the coupled system of PDEs.
Within the framework of this approach the existence of solution is proved [23–25, 27]. Moreover,
based on this approach one can construct an approximate equilibrium in the game with the finite
number of players [27].
The second approach is called probabilistic [10–12,20]. It regards a solution of mean field game
as a Nash equilibrium in a infinite player game. This approach is fruitful in the analysis of the limit
of open-loop Nash equilibria in finite player games [15, 21]. Furthermore, it was used to study the
deterministic limit of stochastic mean field games [3].
The third approach is concerned with so called master equation which is a partial differential
equation in the space of probabilities [6, 9, 27]. This approach was used to study the link between
feedback Nash equilibria in the finite player game and mean field game [8, 19, 22]. Notice that the
existence results for the master equation are obtained for the non-degenerate stochastic mean field
games [8]. Additionally, the short time existence was delivered [11].
The mean field game methodology can be used to analyze the interaction of the large group of
identical small players with the exogenous player. This problem is called mean field games with a
major player [13,14,16,26,28,29]. In this case we study the system of infinitely many identical minor
players and one major players. It is assumed that the minor players can influence on each other and
on the major player only via certain mean-filed characteristics.
There are several game designs suitable for the mean field game with a major player. First one
assumes that the major and minor players choose their strategies simultaneously. It leads to the
Nash solution for the mean field game with a major player. Another game design appears when we
assume that the major player chooses his/her strategy first and announce it. This solution concept
refers to the Stackelberg game with the minor players as followers and the major player as leader.
Previously, the Stackelberg solution of the mean field game with a major player was studied only
for the linear-quadratic games (see [4, 5, 30]).
In the paper we study the Stackelberg solution of the first order mean field game with a major
player, i.e., we assume that the dynamics of the minor and the major players are given by ODEs.
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The main result of the paper is the existence of the Stackelberg solution. The paper is organized as
follows. First, we introduce the general notations. In Section 2 we define the mean field game with
a major player and formulate the main result. In the last section we examine the properties of the
motions and prove the main result.
§ 1. Preliminaries
Given a Polish space (X, ρX), denote by P(X) the set of Borel probabilities on X. We endow
P(X) with the narrow convergence. Further, let P1(X) be the set of probabilities m ∈ P(X)
satisfying, for some (and, thus, any) x0 ∈ X,
ς(m) ,
∫
X
ρX(x, x0)m(dx) <∞.
We introduce on P1(X) the 1-Wasserstein metric by the rule [2]: if m1,m2 ∈ P
1(X), then
W1(m1,m2) = inf
pi∈Π(m1,m2)
∫
X×X
ρ(x1, x2)π(d(x1, x2))
= sup
φ∈Lip1(X)
[∫
X
φ(x)m1(dx)−
∫
X
φ(x)m2(dx)
]
.
Here Π(m1,m2) is the set of plans between m1 and m2 i.e.
Π(m1,m2) , {π ∈ P
1(X ×X) :
π(Γ×X) = m1(X), π(X × Γ) = m2(X) for any measurable Γ ⊂ X};
Lip1(X) stands for the set of 1-Lipschitz continuous functions from X to R. Note that the conver-
gence in W1 implies the narrow convergence [2].
If (Ω1,Σ1), (Ω2,Σ2) are measurable space, m is the probability on Σ1, h : Ω1 → Ω2 is measurable,
then denote by h#m the probability on Σ2 defined by the rule: for Γ ∈ Σ2,
(h#m)(Γ) , m(h
−1(Γ)).
If (X, ρX ), (Y, ρY ) are Polish spaces, η is a finite Borel measure on X, then denote by Λ(X, η, Y )
the set of measures on X × Y with the marginal on X equal to η. As above, we endow Λ(X, η, Y )
with the narrow convergence. Notice that Λ(X, η, Y ) is itself a Polish space. If µ ∈ Λ(X, η, Y ), then
µ(·|x) stands for the disintegration of µ along η, i.e., for each x, µ(·|x) is a probability on Y , for any
φ ∈ Cb(X × Y ), the function
x 7→
∫
Y
φ(x, y)µ(dy|x)
is measurable and ∫
X×X
φ(x, y)µ(d(x, y)) =
∫
X
∫
Y
φ(x, y)µ(dy|x)η(dx).
The existence of the disintegration is proved in [7, Theorems 7.10.6].
Further, if (Z, ρZ) is a Polish space, µ ∈ Λ(X, η, Y ), ν ∈ Λ(X, η, Z), then denote by µ ∗ ν the
measure on X × Y × Z defined by the rule: for any φ ∈ Cb(X × Y × Z),∫
X×Y×Z
φ(x, y, z)(µ ∗ ν)(d(x, y, z)) =
∫
X
∫
X
∫
Y
φ(x, y, z)µ(dy|x)ν(dz|x)η(dx).
The existence of µ ⋆ ν follows from [7, Theorem 10.6.6.]. Notice that µ ∗ ν ∈ Λ(X, η, Y × Z).
Below we consider Rd as a phase space for the control problem of each player. Further, we regard
R
d+1 to be an extended phase space. We often denote the elements of Rd+1 as pairs w = (x, z),
where x ∈ Rd, z ∈ R. If w = (x, z), then set p(w) , x, q(w) , z. For a fixed T > 0, let C
stand for C([0, T ],Rd+1). If t ∈ [0, T ], then denote by et, eˆt the operators from C onto R
d and Rd+1
respectively defined by the rules: for w(·) = (x(·), z(·)),
et(w(·)) , x(t), eˆt(w(·)) , w(t).
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§ 2. Mean field game with a major player
We assume that the system consists of one major player and infinitely many minor player. Let
the dynamics of the major player be given by
d
dt
x(t) = f(t, x(t),m(t), u(t)), (2.1)
whereas the dynamics of each minor player be given by
d
dt
y(t) = g(t, x(t), y(t),m(t), u(t), v(t)). (2.2)
Here t ∈ [0, T ]; x(t) ∈ Rd, y(t) ∈ Rd are states of major and minor players respectively; u(t) ∈ U ,
v(t) ∈ V stand for the controls of major and minor players, m(t) ∈ P1(Rd) is a distribution of
minors player at a time t. The initial distribution of the minor players m0 and the initial state of
the major player x0 are assumed to be given.
It is assumed that the objective function of the major player is
I(x(·),m(·), u(·)) , ξ(x(T ),m(T )) +
∫ T
0
f0(t, x(t),m(t), u(t))dt;
whereas the representative minor player wishes to maximize the outcome equal to
J(x(·), y(·),m(·), u(t), v(t)) , ζ(x(T ), y(T ),m(T )) +
∫ T
0
g0(t, x(t), y(t),m(t), u(t), v(t))dt.
As it was mentioned above, we are seeking for the Stackelberg solution with major player as the
leader. This means that the minor players solve their mean field game for the given control of the
major player, whereas the major player maximizes his/her outcome subject to the solution of the
mean field game of the minor players.
We impose the following conditions.
(C1) The sets U and V are metric compacts.
(C2) The functions f , f0, g, g0, ξ and ζ are continuous.
(C3) The functions f , f0 are Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. x and m.
(C4) The functions g, g0 are Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. x, y and m.
(C5) The functions f , f0, g, g0 are bounded.
(C6) The initial distribution of minor players m0 lies in P
1(Rd).
Now, let us introduce the extended dynamics. For t ∈ [0, T ], xˆ, yˆ ∈ Rd+1, m ∈ P1(Rd), u ∈ U ,
v ∈ V , we put
fˆ(t, xˆ,m, u) , (f(t,p(xˆ),m, u), f0(t,p(xˆ),m, u)),
gˆ(t, xˆ, yˆ,m, u, v) , (g(t,p(xˆ),p(yˆ),m, u, v), g0(t,p(xˆ),p(yˆ),m, u, v)).
The extended dynamics for the major player is
d
dt
xˆ(t) = fˆ(t, xˆ(t),m(t), u(t)), xˆ(0) = (x0, 0);
whereas the dynamics of the representative minor player is
d
dt
yˆ(t) = gˆ(t, xˆ(t), yˆ(t),m(t), u(t), v(t)).
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Here, m(t) is a distribution of the minor players in the original phase space at the time t. Note that
in this case the major player wishes to maximize the outcome
ξˆ(xˆ(T ),m(T )) , ξ(p(xˆ(T )),m(T )) + q(xˆ(T )).
Whereas the representative minor player wishes to maximize
ζˆ(xˆ(T ), yˆ(T ),m(T )) , ζ(p(xˆ(T )),p(yˆ(T )),m(T )) + q(yˆ(T )).
Obviously, the function fˆ is Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. xˆ and m, whereas gˆ is Lipschitz con-
tinuous w.r.t. xˆ, yˆ and m. Moreover, these functions are bounded. This means that, for some
non-negative K and C0,
‖fˆ(t, xˆ,m, u)− fˆ(t, xˆ′,m′, u)‖ ≤ K‖x− x′‖+KW1(m,m
′),
‖gˆ(t, xˆ, yˆ,m, u, v) − gˆ(t, xˆ′, yˆ′,m′, u, v)‖ ≤ K‖xˆ− xˆ′‖+K‖yˆ − yˆ′‖+KW1(m,m
′),
‖fˆ(t, xˆ,m, u)‖, ‖gˆ(t, xˆ, yˆ,m, u, v)‖ ≤ C0. (2.3)
As it was mentioned in Introduction, we consider the Stackelberg solution of the mean field game
in the class of relaxed open-loop strategies. Put U , Λ([0, T ], λ, U), V , Λ([0, T ], λ, V ). Notice that
U and V are the sets of relaxed controls of the major and minor players. Moreover, it is convenient to
consider the distributions of motions instead of the flow of probabilities on the phase space. Below
let χ ∈ P(C), µ ∈ U . Denote by xˆ(·, χ, µ) the solution of the equation
xˆ(t) = (x0, 0) +
∫
[0,t]×U
fˆ(τ, xˆ(τ), eτ#χ, u)µ(d(τ, u)).
If, additionally, y0 ∈ R
d, x˜ ∈ C, ν ∈ V, then denote by yˆ(·, y0, x˜, χ, µ, ν) the solution of the equation
yˆ(t) = (y0, 0) +
∫
[0,t]×U×V
gˆ(τ, x˜(τ), yˆ(τ), eτ#χ, u, v)(µ ∗ ν)(d(τ, u, v)).
Denote the mapping that assigns to y0, x˜, χ, µ and ν the motion yˆ(·) by Φ.
Further, set A , Λ(Rd,m0,U). Elements of A are distributions of the minor players’ controls.
A distribution of controls generates the distribution on C by the following rule: if χ ∈ P1(C), µ ∈ U ,
γ ∈ A, x˜ is equal to xˆ(·, χ, µ), then Ξ(χ, µ, γ) , Φ(·, x˜, χ, µ, ·)#γ.
Further, we say that χ is a distribution of minor players generated by the distribution of the
minor players’ controls γ and the major player’s control µ if
Ξ(χ, µ, γ) = χ.
Below we denote by Ψ(µ, γ) the distribution of the minor players generated by µ and γ.
P r o p o s i t i o n 2.1. Given a relaxed control of the major player, and a distribution of the
controls of minor players γ, there exists a unique distribution of the minor players Ψ(µ, γ).
This proposition is proved in Section 3.
D e f i n i t i o n 2.1. We say that γ is an equilibrium distribution of the minor players’ controls
corresponding to µ if, for χ∗ = Ψ(µ, γ), x˜ = x(·, χ∗, µ), γ∗-a.e. (y0, ν) and any ν
′ ∈ V,
ζˆ(xˆ(T, χ∗, µ),yˆ(T, y0, x˜, χ
∗, µ, ν), eT#χ)
≥ ζˆ(xˆ(T, χ∗, µ), yˆ(T, y0, x˜, χ
∗, µ, ν ′), eT#χ).
Denote by E(µ) the set of equilibrium distributions of the minor players’ controls corresponding
to µ.
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D e f i n i t i o n 2.2. We say that µ∗ ∈ U and γ∗ ∈ A provide a Stackelberg solution of the mean
field game with a major player if
(a) γ∗ ∈ E(µ∗);
(b) ξˆ(xˆ(T,Ψ(µ∗, γ∗), µ∗), eT#Ψ(µ
∗, γ∗)) ≥ sup{ξˆ(xˆ(T,Ψ(µ, γ′), µ), eT#Ψ(µ
∗, γ)) : µ ∈ V, γ ∈ E(µ)}.
The main result of the paper is the following.
T h e o r e m 2.1. There exists at least one Stackelberg solution in the mean filed game with major
player.
This statement is proved in Section 3.
§ 3. Properties of the motions
This section is concerned with the continuous dependence of the motions introduced in the
previous section on its parameters.
P r o p o s i t i o n 3.1. The dependence (χ, µ) 7→ xˆ(·, χ, µ) is continuous.
P r o o f. Assume that µn → µ andW1(χn, χ)→ 0 as n→∞. We shall prove that ‖xˆ(·, χn, µn)−
xˆ(·, χ, µ)‖ → 0.
Denote x˜n , xˆ(·, χn, µn), x˜ , xˆ(·, χ, µ). Recall that K is a Lipschitz constant for fˆ and gˆ. For
t ∈ [0, T ], we have that
‖x˜n(t)− x˜(t)‖
=
∥∥∥
∫
[0,t]×U
fˆ(t, x˜n(τ), eτ#χn, u)µn(d(τ, u))
−
∫
[0,t]×U
fˆ(t, x˜(τ), eτ#χ, u)µ(d(τ, u))
∥∥∥
≤
∫
[0,t]×U
‖fˆ(t, x˜n(τ), eτ#χn, u)− fˆ(t, x˜(τ), eτ#χ, u)‖µn(d(τ, u))
+
∥∥∥∥∥
∫
[0,t]×U
fˆ(τ, x˜(τ), eτ#χ, u)(µn(d(τ, u) − µ(d(τ, u)))
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ K
∫ t
0
‖x˜n(τ)− x˜(τ)‖dτ +KtW1(χn, χ)
+
∥∥∥∥∥
∫
[0,t]×U
fˆ(τ, x˜(τ), eτ#χ, u)(µn(d(τ, u) − µ(d(τ, u)))
∥∥∥∥∥ .
(3.1)
Since µn → µ, we have that, for any θ ∈ [0, T ],∥∥∥∥∥
∫
[0,θ]×U
fˆ(τ, x˜(τ), eτ#χ, u)(µn(d(τ, u) − µ(d(τ, u)))
∥∥∥∥∥
converges to 0 as n→∞. Let L be a natural number, l ∈ 1, L, tlL = lT/L. We have that
rnL , sup
l∈1,L
∥∥∥∥∥
∫
[0,tl
L
]×U
fˆ(τ, x˜(τ), eτ#χ, u)(µn(d(τ, u) − µ(d(τ, u)))
∥∥∥∥∥
converges to 0 as n→∞ for any natural L. Further, we have that
∥∥∥∥∥
∫
[0,t]×U
fˆ(τ, x˜(τ), eτ#χ, u)(µn(d(τ, u) − µ(d(τ, u)))
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ rnL + 2C0T/L.
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Here C0 satisfies (2.3). This and (3.1) imply
‖x˜n(t)− x˜(t)‖ ≤ K
∫ t
0
‖x˜n(τ)− x˜(τ)‖dτ +KtW1(χn, χ) + r
n
L + 2C0T/L.
Using the Gronwall’s inequality, we get
‖x˜n(t)− x˜(t)‖ ≤ e
KT (KTW1(χn, χ) + r
n
L + 2C0T/L).
Since W1(χn, χ)→ 0 and r
n
L → 0 as n→ for any natural L, we conclude that
lim
n→∞
‖x˜n − x˜‖ ≤ 2e
KTC0T/L.
Further, letting L→∞, we get that
lim
n→∞
‖x˜n − x˜‖ = 0.
P r o p o s i t i o n 3.2. The dependence (y0, x˜, χ, µ, ν) 7→ yˆ(·, y0, x˜, χ, µ, ν) is continuous.
This proposition is proved in the same way as the previous one.
Let Y be the set of probabilities χ on C satisfying the following properties:
1. eˆ0#χ is concentrated on R
d × {0};
2. e0#χ = m0;
3. χ is concentrated on the set of C0-Lipschitz continuous functions from [0, T ] to R
d+1.
Since m0 ∈ P
1(C), we have that Y is a compact set in P1(C) [2]. Additionally, notice that, for
any χ ∈ P1(C), µ ∈ U , γ ∈ A,
Ξ(χ, µ, γ) ∈ Y. (3.2)
P r o p o s i t i o n 3.3. The dependence (Y,U ,A) ∋ (χ, µ, γ) 7→ Ξ(χ, µ, γ) ∈ Y is continuous.
P r o o f. Let W1(χn, χ∗) → 0, µn → µ∗, γn → γ∗ as n → ∞. Set x˜n , xˆ(·, χn, µn), x˜∗ ,
xˆ(·, χ∗, µ∗). By Proposition 3.1,
‖x˜n − x˜∗‖ → 0 as n→∞. (3.3)
Further, let ̺n ∈ P
1(Rd × U × V) be such that, for any φ ∈ Cb(R
d × U × V),
∫
Rd×U×V
φ(x, µ, ν)̺n(d(x, µ, ν)) =
∫
Rd×V
φ(x, µn, ν)γn(d(x, ν)).
Analogously, define ̺∗ ∈ P
1(Rd × U × V) by the rule:
∫
Rd×U×V
φ(x, µ, ν)̺∗(d(x, µ, ν)) =
∫
Rd×V
φ(x, µ∗, ν)γ∗(d(x, ν)).
The existence of the probabilities ̺n and ̺∗ follows from [7, Theorem 7.10.6]. Notice that
̺n → ̺∗ as n→∞. (3.4)
We have that Ξ(χn, µn, γn) = Φ(·, x˜n, χn, ·, ·)#̺n, Ξ(χ∗, µ∗, γ∗) = Φ(·, x˜∗, χ∗, ·, ·)#̺∗. Thus,
W1(Ξ(χn, µn, γn),Ξ(χ∗, µ∗, γ∗)) ≤W1(Φ(·, x˜n, χn, ·, ·)#̺n,Φ(·, x˜∗, χ∗, ·, ·)#̺n)
+W1(Φ(·, x˜∗, χ∗, ·, ·)#̺n,Φ(·, x˜∗, χ∗, ·, ·)#̺∗).
(3.5)
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Choosing the plan between Φ(·, x˜n, χn, ·, ·)#̺n and Φ(·, x˜∗, χ∗, ·, ·)#̺n equal to
(Φ(·, x˜n, χn, ·, ·),Φ(·, x˜∗, χ∗, ·, ·))#̺n, we get
W1(Φ(·, x˜n,χn, ·, ·)#̺n,Φ(·, x˜∗, χ∗, ·, ·)#̺n)
≤
∫
Rd+1×U×V
‖Φ(y0, x˜n, χn, µ, ν)− Φ(y0, x˜∗, χ∗, µ, ν)‖̺n(d(y0, µ, ν)).
(3.6)
To estimate ‖Φ(y0, x˜n, χn, µ, ν) − Φ(y0, x˜∗, χ∗, µ, ν)‖ recall that ‖Φ(y0, x˜n, χn, µ, ν) −
Φ(y0, x˜∗, χ∗, µ, ν)‖ is equal to supt∈[0,T ] ‖yˆn(t, y0, x˜n, χn, µ, ν)− yˆ(t, y0, x˜∗, χ∗, µ, ν)‖. Further,
‖yˆn(t, y0, x˜n, χn, µ, ν)− yˆ(t, y0, x˜∗, χ∗, µ, ν)‖
≤ K
∫ t
0
‖yˆn(τ, y0, x˜n, χn, µ, ν)− yˆ(τ,y0, x˜∗, χ∗, µ, ν)‖dτ +Kt‖x˜n − x˜∗‖+KtW1(χn, χ∗).
The Gronwall’s inequality yields that supt∈[0,T ] ‖yˆn(t, y0, x˜n, χn, µ, ν)−yˆ(t, y0, x˜∗, χ∗, µ, ν)‖ converges
to zero uniformly w.r.t. y0, µ, and ν. Thus, by (3.6) we have that
W1(Φ(·, x˜n, χn, ·, ·)#̺n,Φ(·, x˜∗, χ∗, ·, ·)#̺n)→ 0 as n→∞. (3.7)
To prove thatW1(Φ(·, x˜∗, χ∗, ·, ·)#̺n,Φ(·, x˜∗, χ∗, ·, ·)#̺∗)→ 0 as n→∞, recall that ̺n converges
to ̺∗ narrowly. Consider the compact set CR , {yˆ ∈ C : ‖yˆ(0)‖ ≤ R}. We have that the restriction of
Φ(·, x˜∗, χ∗, ·, ·)#̺n on CR converges narrowly to the restriction of Φ(·, x˜∗, χ∗, ·, ·)#̺∗ on CR. Further,
for any φ ∈ Cb(C),
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
C\CR
φ(yˆ)χn(dyˆ)
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
C\CR
φ(yˆ)χ(dyˆ)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖φ‖m0(Rd \BR),
where BR stands for the ball of radius R centered at the origin. Therefore,
we conclude that Φ(·, x˜∗, χ∗, ·, ·)#̺n converges narrowly to Φ(·, x˜∗, χ∗, ·, ·)#̺∗. Since
Φ(·, x˜∗, χ∗, ·, ·)#̺n,Φ(·, x˜∗, χ∗, ·, ·)#̺∗ are concentrated on Y and Y is compact, we conclude that
W1(Φ(·, x˜∗, χ∗, ·, ·)#̺n,Φ(·, x˜∗, χ∗, ·, ·)#̺∗)→ 0 as n→∞.
Hence, taking into account (3.5) and (3.7), we get the consequence of the proposition.
P r o o f o f P r o p o s i t i o n 2.1. The existence of the Ψ(µ, γ) follows from the compactness
of Y, (3.2), the continuity of the mapping P(C) ∋ χ 7→ Ξ(χ, µ, γ) ∈ Y for all µ and γ and the famous
Schauder fixed-point theorem [1, Corollary 17.56].
To prove the uniqueness, let us consider, for θ ∈ [0, T ], the space Cθ , C([0, θ],Rd+1). Notice
that C = CT . Further, denote by rθ the natural projection from C on Cθ. Now assume that there
exist two probabilities χ1 and χ2 such that χi = Ξ(χi, µ, γ). Let x˜i = xˆ(·, µ, χi). Notice that there
exists a constant c1 such that
‖x˜1(t)− x˜2(t)‖ ≤ c1W1(r
t
#χ1, r
t
#χ2). (3.8)
Using the Lipschitz continuity of the function g and (3.8), we have that
‖yˆ(t, y0, x˜1, χ1, µ, ν)−yˆ(t, y0, x˜2, χ2, µ, ν)‖
≤ K
∫ t
0
‖yˆ(τ,y0, x˜1, χ1, µ, ν)− yˆ(τ, y0, x˜2, χ2, µ, ν)‖dτ
+K
∫ t
0
‖x˜1(τ)− x˜2(τ)‖dτ +K
∫ t
0
W1(r
τ
#χ1, r
τ
#χ2)
≤ K
∫ t
0
‖yˆ(τ,y0, x˜1, χ1, µ, ν)− yˆ(τ, y0, x˜2, χ2, µ, ν)‖dτ
+K(c1 + 1)
∫ t
0
W1(r
τ
#χ1, r
τ
#χ2)dτ.
(3.9)
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The Gronwall’s inequality gives the following estimate, for some constant c2:
‖yˆ(t, y0, x˜1, χ1, µ, ν)− yˆ(t, y0, x˜2, χ2, µ, ν)‖ ≤ c2
∫ t
0
W1(r
τ
#χ1, r
τ
#χ2)dτ.
Therefore, we have that, for any θ ∈ [0, T ],
sup
t∈[0,θ]
‖yˆ(t, y0, x˜1, χ1, µ, ν)− yˆ(t, y0, x˜2, χ2, µ, ν)‖ ≤ c2
∫ θ
0
W1(r
τ
#χ1, r
τ
#χ2)dτ.
Integrating this inequality w.r.t. the probability γ, we get the estimate
W1(r
θ
#χ1, r
θ
#χ2) ≤ c2
∫ θ
0
W1(r
τ
#χ1, r
τ
#χ2)dτ.
Using the Gronwall’s inequality once more time, we conclude that, for any θ ∈ [0, T ],
W1(r
θ
#χ1, r
θ
#χ2) ≤ 0.
Since rT = id, we obtain the uniqueness.
P r o p o s i t i o n 3.4. For any µ ∈ U , the set E(µ) is nonempty. Moreover, the mapping µ 7→
E(µ) is upper semicontinuous.
P r o o f. Given γ ∈ A, let us construct the multifunction Γ[µ, γ] taking values in A by the
following rule. First, set χ , Ψ(µ, γ). Further, let B[µ, γ] be the set of pairs (w, ν∗) ∈ R
d × V such
that, for any ν ∈ V,
ζˆ(xˆ(T, χ, µ), yˆ(T,w, χ, µ, ν∗), eT#χ) ≥ ζˆ(xˆ(T, χ, µ), yˆ(T,w, χ, µ, ν), eT#χ). (3.10)
Put Γ[µ, γ] be equal to the set of all distributions γ′ ∈ A such that supp(γ′) ⊂ B[µ, γ].
Notice that γ ∈ E(µ) iff
γ ∈ Γ[µ, γ].
Let us show that Γ is upper semicontinuous. Indeed, assume that µn → µ∗, γn → γ∗, γ
′
n ∈
Γ[µn, γn], γ
′
n → γ
′
∗. We shall prove that supp(γ
′
∗) ⊂ B[µ∗, γ∗]. Pick (w∗, ν∗) ∈ supp(γ
′
∗). By [2,
Proposition 5.1.8] we have that there exists (wn, νn) ∈ supp(γ
′
n) such that wn → w∗, νn → ν∗. Since
supp(γ′n) ⊂ B[µn, γn], we have that, for χn , Ψ(µn, γn), and any ν ∈ V,
ζˆ(xˆ(T, χn, µn),yˆ(T,wn, χn, µn, νn), eT#χn)
≥ ζˆ(xˆ(T, χn, µn), yˆ(T,wn, χn, µn, ν), eT#χn).
Using the continuity of all functions and passing to the limit, we get that, for any ν ∈ V,
ζˆ(xˆ(T, χ∗, µ∗),yˆ(T,w∗, χ∗, µ∗, ν∗), eT#χ∗)
≥ ζˆ(xˆ(T, χ∗, µn), yˆ(T,wn, χ∗, µ∗, ν), eT#χ∗).
This means that γ′∗ ∈ Γ[µ∗, γ∗].
Further, let us show that Γ[µ, γ] is nonempty. To this end, given w ∈ Rd, pick
ν¯(w) ∈ Argmax{ζˆ(xˆ(T, χ, µ), yˆ(T,w, χ, µ, ν), eT#χ) : ν ∈ V}. (3.11)
Here we denote χ , Ψ(µ, γ). Without loss of generality one can choose the function ν¯ to be
measurable. Define γ′ by the rule: for any φ ∈ Cb(R
d × V),∫
Rd+1×V
φ(w, ν)γ′(d(w, ν)) ,
∫
Rd
φ(w, ν¯(w))m0(dw).
Obviously, supp(γ′) = {(w, ν¯(w)) : w ∈ supp(m0)}. Therefore, γ
′ ∈ A. Furthermore, (3.11) implies
that inequality (3.10) is fulfilled for every (w, ν∗) ∈ supp(γ
′) and any ν. Hence, γ′ ∈ Γ[µ, γ].
Additionally, the set Γ[µ, γ] is convex by the construction. Thus, by the Fan–Gliksberg theorem [1,
Corollary 17.55], for each µ ∈ U , there exists a fixed point of the multifunction γ ⇒ Γ[µ, γ]. Since
E(µ) = {γ ∈ A : γ ∈ Γ[µ, γ]} and the multifunction Γ is upper semicontinuous, we have that the E
is also upper semicontinuous.
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P r o o f o f T h e o r e m 2.1. By Definition 2.2, we have that (µ∗, γ∗) is the Stackelberg
solution iff
(µ∗, γ∗) ∈ Argmax{ξˆ(xˆ(T,Ψ(µ, γ), µ), eT#Ψ(µ, γ)) : µ ∈ U , γ ∈ E(µ)}.
Notice that, by Proposition 3.4, the set
gr(E) , {(µ, γ) : µ ∈ U , γ ∈ E}
is compact. Additionally, by construction, we have the set U is also compact. Thus, using the
continuity of the functions Ψ, xˆ and ξˆ, we get the existence result for the Stackelberg solution in the
first-order mean filed game with a major player.
Funding. The research was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (project
no. 17–01–00069).
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Статья посвящена исследованию системы большого числа однотипных игроков, взаимодействующих с внешним
окружением. Мы моделируем это окружение как ведущего (внешнего) игрока. Основное предположение нашей
модели состоит в том, что малые игроки могут влиять друг на друга и на ведущего игрока лишь через
те или иные усредненные характеристики. Подобные модели носят название игр среднего поля с ведущим
игроком. Мы предполагаем, что время непрерывно и динамика ведущего и малых игроков описывается
обыкновенными дифференциальными уравнениями. Мы рассматриваем решение по Штакельбергу с ведущим
игроком–лидером, то есть предполагается, что ведущий игрок объявляет заранее свое управление малым
игрокам. Основной результат статьи состоит в доказательстве существования решения по Штакельбергу игры
среднего поля с ведущим игроком в классе обобщенных программных управлений.
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